It is important to review what the literature has written about challenges and criticisms of corporate accelerators with a critical reflection.
This post represents a series of articles related to a research and dissertation called “Are corporate accelerators springboards for startups: a performance analysis of the Microsoft’s and Google’s accelerated.
Introduction
Corporate accelerators (CAs) are not immune to criticism or questioning about their practices and results. While they promise mentorship and coaching in many forms, funding opportunities, and expanding networks of contact for the startup, literature and real-world outcomes suggest that these benefits are not guaranteed, or evenly distributed among participants. This section addresses the challenges and criticisms of corporate accelerators, focusing on five main concerns:
- overstated benefits and inflated expectations,
- selection bias and filter illusion,
- short-term boost vs. long-term fragility,
- strategic misalignment with corporates,
- and power imbalance and dependency risk.
Understanding these criticisms and their reasoning is crucial to comprehend whether corporate accelerators serve their purpose to function as springboards—or if, in some cases, they results into sand traps that hinder instead of help.
Overstated Benefits and Inflated Expectations
Many startups enter corporate accelerators expecting transformational change, like a big leap forward. They often envision immediate access to high-profile clients, capital, and new markets. However, Hallen et al. (2022) introduce the concept of the “sand trap” effect, where instead of launching forward, startups become stuck, dependent on the patreon corporation’s resources, brand, or infrastructure and their expected move forward becomes immobilised. These startups may stop innovating independently, relying on the corporation for validation or support.
In other words, accelerators might offer what seems like gold, but it may be just glitter, like a shiny mirage. As Chowdhury and Audretsch (2023) caution, some relationships remain for status purposes, functioning more as a marketing badge than as a real launchpad. Such situation may drive to unrealistic expectations, where startups confuse visibility for value.
Selection Bias and Filter Illusion
A recurring critique in the literature is that accelerators, including corporate ones, often select startups that are already promising. As Woolley and Macgregor (2022) explain, selection bias (preferential choice) makes it difficult to measure an accelerator’s actual contribution. If most participants would have succeeded anyway, then the accelerator’s impact is overstated and less relevant.
Following this statement, corporate accelerators often could function as filters rather than promoters, choosing the best potential candidates only. As a result, reported success rates may not reflect the value added by the program but rather the preexisting quality of the selected startups. Thus, the perception of effectiveness is partially a result of how strict the entry criteria are, not how transformative the program is.
Short-Term Boost vs. Long-Term Fragility
Accelerators are typically short in duration, ranging from a few weeks to a few months. This timeframe may generate a short-term boost: startups pitch, raise capital, get media exposure, done. But as noted in section “The Impact of Accelerators on Startup Performance“, that momentum can fade if the startup has not forged a solid team nor built a sustainable product.
Chowdhury and Audretsch (2023) describe the “post-acceleration plateau”, a common phase where startups slow down or stagnate after the program ends. Without continuous support, many fail to maintain performance. The startup ends up with polished slides and a brand name on its deck (like a recognition trophy) but lacks a competitive edge in the long run.
Strategic Misalignment with Corporates
One unique challenge of corporate accelerators is the misalignment between startup's vision or goal in mind and corporate's agenda. Startups may begin to overcustomize their product or services to suit the corporation’s immediate needs. While this might result in a short-term fruitful partnership, it can lead to strategic drift or detour, where the startup loses focus on its original market orientation or mission.
Fehder (2023) explains that some startups become “custom suppliers” to the corporate partner, focusing entirely on one client or vertical. This makes the startup less attractive to other investors or clients, reducing long-term scalability. Instead of accelerating innovation, the corporation ends up creating a dependency loop that locks the startup into one ecosystem and the corporate accelerator program.
Power Imbalance and Dependency Risk
Startups, by nature, are risky and fragile. When paired with powerful corporations, the risk of asymmetric relationships becomes evident. While accelerators often present themselves as partners, the power dynamic is rarely equal. Startups may feel pressure to comply, conform, or undervalue their equity and vision in exchange for access.
Mishigragchaa (2017) highlights that when startups depend heavily on the corporate sponsor for capital, technology, or distribution, they risk losing autonomy. In some cases, these relationships evolve into quasi-outsourcing arrangements, where the startup becomes an external defacto R&D wing of the corporation.
Comparative Table: Promise vs. Pitfall
To summarise the recurring criticisms in contrast with the perceived benefits, the following table captures the duality of corporate accelerators:
| Perceived Benefit | Observed Challenge |
|---|---|
| Global brand association | Superficial support with little long-term engagement |
| Mentorship and coaching | One-size-fits-all advice not tailored nor adjusted to startup realities |
| Access to investors and clients | Relationship often limited to demo day interactions |
| Rapid product-market journey | Strategic drift due to adapting too much to corporate needs |
| Follow-on funding and partnerships | Dependency risk and weakened independence |
Conclusion
Corporate accelerators can undoubtedly offer visibility, resources, and connections that startups would otherwise struggle to access anyway. Yet, the literature highlights that not all that glitters is gold. Dependency on the corporate host for prolonged periods of time, summed with strategic misalignments, pose serious risks. By understanding these serious challenges, it avoids pitfalls like glorifying accelerator programs, such as like Google's and Microsoft's, and instead it seeks to provide a solid understanding of both its potential and its limits or shortcomings. This reflection is essential for evaluating if corporate accelerator programs truly act as performance catalysts, or merely as temporary exhibition platforms.
References
- Chowdhury, F., & Audretsch, D. B. (2023). Paradoxes of accelerator programs and new venture performance: Do varieties of experiences make a difference? Small Business Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-023-00778-y
- Fehder, D. C. (2023). Coming from a good pond: The influence of a new venture’s founding ecosystem on accelerator performance. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392231204839
- Hallen, B. L., Cohen, S. L., & Park, S. H. (2022). Are seed accelerators status springboards for startups? Or sand traps? Strategic Management Journal, 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3484
- Seitz, N., Krieger, B., Mauer, R., & Brettel, M. (2023). Corporate accelerators: Design and startup performance. Small Business Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-023-00732-y
- Woolley, J. L., & Macgregor, N. (2022). The influence of incubator and accelerator participation on nanotechnology venture success. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 46(6), 1717–1755. https://doi.org/10.1177/10422587211024510
